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nature of the soul comes to its rights; that is, to positive value."
Whatever the significance of the metaphysical doctrine underlying this
conception, it will be admitted that psychic facts should not be
described on the basis of metaphysical distinctions.
There is little need to discuss in detail the metaphysical doctrine
of the book, for the position of Lipps is well known. Underlying the
empirical I, which he has described so vividly, there is, he teaches, a
real I, or soul, whose activities constitute the psychic occurrences
(Vorgange). And behind the psychic object he assumes a transcen-
dental object, which atone has causality. For the real I he argues,
f^irst (p. 7), on the ground that a ' permanent somewhat, a substratum,
is presupposed by psychic phenomena'; second, by an appeal (p. 9)
to the everyday consciousness; third, and most plausibly (p. 40 et a/.),
by a reference to the experiences — remembering the once forgotten,
for example — which are easily explained by the soul-activity hypoth-
esis. No one of these arguments, it must be admitted, demonstrates
the reality of this shadowy double of the I immediately known. Even
less convincing is the argument for the existence of the transcendent
object: that causality presupposes it, since causality is, by its very
nature, a causality between the objectively [that is, the transcendentally]
real. But this assumes the very point at issue, ignoring the conception
of cause, prevalent since Hume introduced it, as mere connection of
phenomena.
This notice has failed of one of its aims, if it has not suggested the
merit of the book which it criticises. A ' guide to psychology' the
book, it is true, is not likely to become, except for its author's own
students, partly because, as the brief preface states, it is quite bare of
reference to the literature of the subject, partly because of its total
neglect of the physiological conditions of psychical phenomena, but
especially on account of the radical defects already named. Yet the
distinctive psychological doctrines of Lipps are so vigorously, and
so effectively set forth, that the book has positive, and — at some
points — great value.
The Meaning of the Physical from the Point of View of the Func-
tional Psychology. H . H E A T H BAWDEN, Philosophical Review,
1904, XIII . , 29S-319.
The criticism and discussion already called forth l by this paper
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of Professor Bawden, and by those which preceded it,1 furnish evi-
dence of the suggestiveness of his conception of psychical and physi-
cal respectively as ' tensional* action and • stable' action (p. 301), or/
as 'focus' and ' marginal context' (pp. 308, 318 et al.) The doctrine
is criticized mainly on three grounds: first, the lack of precise equiv-
alence between the terms ' tensional' and ' focal,' on the one hand,
and the terms stable and marginal, on the other; second, the variable-
ness of the characters attributed to psychical and to physical; third,
the deduction from these premises of an identity-theory, in place of
the idealism which — it is claimed — is the logical outcome. With
these criticisms, in their general outline, the writer of this notice is in
agreement. The purpose of this paragraph is, however, primarily to
call attention to the discussion; and incidentally to point out that the
interests involved are metaphysical, not psychological. From the
standpoint of psychology, pure and simple, both the psychical and
the physical are primary data to be accepted on their face value, as
distinct sorts of fact. The investigation of their ultimate nature is a
metaphysical, not a psychological, problem. The tasks of psychology
are first, to analyze and to classify psychical facts; and second, so far
as possible, to explain them scientifically — that is, to refer each one
of them to the facts, psychical or physical, which it regularly accom-
panies.
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The Physiological Factors of the Attention Process. W. McDou-
GAIX. II., Mind, No. 47, pp. 289-302; III., ibid., No. 48, pp.
473-488.
In the first of these papers we have not, as we might expect, an ex-
pansion of argument of the first paper of the series, but the author takes
a new standpoint that is apparently almost unrelated to the old. There
the attention processes were pictured as due to the varying permea-
bility of nerve tracts at different levels, in this the explanation is on
the basis of the hydrostatics of a hypothetical nerve fluid, neurin.
Each nerve process is pictured as corresponding to the release of a
certain amount of the neurin in one nerve group, which flows to and
tends to excite other related nerve processes in other nerve groups
when it is itself in any way in activity. The theory is- strongly sug-
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